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In this paper we develop a common agency model to analyze the problem of pirates entering the
market, in which the incumbent and the consumers form pressure groups to lobby the government
on policies to prevent piracy while the pirates try to avoid being stopped. We show that a monopoly
is not an equilibrium when both the incumbent and consumers lobby the government, and that the
cost of monitoring commercial piracy is very important in determining (truthful) equilibria, as is the
case where there is no lobby competition. However, it is now more diﬃcult getting the pirate to enter
the market.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Most studies about piracy show the industry losses from piracy by region, highlighting the large losses in
North America and the European Union because the markets there are so large, even though these regions
have relatively low piracy rates. In particular, the 2005 Global Software Piracy Study reveals that losses
in 2004 (expressed in millions of dollars) totalled 1,546 in Latin America, 2,313 in Eastern Europe, 7,549
in North America and 12,151 in the EU. Thus, the incumbent may use two tools for preventing piracy:
(i) it can develop an antipiracy system such as digital rights management (DRM) and (ii) it can also
set low prices. DRM can be prejudicial to consumers of original information goods, because it hinders
the use of those goods. For instance, DRM for music can limit the uses of music ﬁles downloaded from
online retailers, the number of computers to which the user can transfer his or her ﬁles and the number
of times a playlist can be burned on a CD-R (Duchêne and Waelbroeck (2006)). However, the latest
technological developments and the Internet have enabled consumers to overcome these restrictions so
that consumers are able to learn by copying, to the point where it is possible that some consumers may
prefer a copy to an original information good because they can use the copy more easily in more devices
and even improve its quality (Martínez-Sánchez (2008)). On the other hand, setting low prices is a very
useful method of preventing piracy as Papadopoulos (2003) shows empirically and Bae and Choi (2006)
and Martínez-Sánchez (2010) show theoretically. But these tools are costly, so in order to maintain a
monopoly proﬁt the incumbent lobbies the government for it to carry out harsh policies against piracy.
However, consumers prefer that the government only partially protects the incumbent because piracy
helps to limit the prices that the incumbent sets (Martínez-Sánchez (2010)). Therefore, consumers lobby
the government for it carry out a mild policy against piracy.1
The importance of lobbying the government to prevent the entry of a pirate in the market has been
analyzed by Banerjee (2006), in which political pressure is only carried out by the developer of the
original good and not by consumers. He comes to the conclusion that special interest lobbying may result
in monitoring as the optimal policy, although not monitoring is the unique socially optimal policy where
t h ep i r a t ea l w a y se n t e r st h em a r k e t .
In this paper, we develop a common agency model, as in Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Dixit
et al. (1997), to analyze the problem of pirates entering the market when the incumbent and consumers
form pressure groups to lobby the government regarding policies to prevent them and the pirate tries to
avoid being stopped.2 Given that in common agency models there is a multiplicity of equilibrium (Dixit
et al. (1997)), to overcome it we consider the truthful equilibrium reﬁnement introduced by Bernheim
and Whinston (1986), which selects equilibria that implement eﬃcient actions and are coalition-proof
Nash Equilibria. We focus on a game with complete information for two reasons. Firstly, although a fully
1In our model, we can think that the incumbent’s lobby represents the lobby of software ﬁrms and the lobby of record
companies, and that the consumers’ lobby represents the lobby of consumers’ association. As cases in point, we can quote
t w on e w si t e m st a k e nf r o mt h eS p a n i s hn e w s p a p e rEl País: "EMI, NBC, Microsoft y Vivendi form a ’lobby’ for ﬁghting
piracy" (2005) and, "SGAE and consumers mobilize for tax" (2007).
2Common agency models have already been applied to analyze how the government makes economic policies. For
instance, Grossman and Helpman (1994) analyses how the government forms trade policy.
2satisfactory theory of menu auctions would certainly allow for incomplete information, we would soon see
that signiﬁcant complexities arise even when there is no private information (Bernheim and Whinston
(1986)). Second, ruling out informational considerations permits us to isolate the eﬀect on the outcome
of the game of the competition between the principals from the eﬀect of the existence of some private
information (Laussel and Le Breton (2001)).
Over the past few years, most digital products have frequently been illegally copied and sold, to the
point where it is possible to ﬁnd a new product pirated before it is oﬃcially launched on the market. As
cases in point, we can mention two news items taken from the Spanish newspaper EL PAIS:“ N e wG a r c í a
Márquez Novel Pirated In Colombia Before Its Presentation”(2004b) and, “Pirated Version Of Xbox’s
Star Game For Christmas Appears On Internet”(2004a). Moreover, while I write this introduction, a
pirated version of the ﬁlm "X-Men Origins: Wolverine" has appeared on the Internet one month before
its oﬃcial presentation. For this reason, it can be reasonable to assume that pirates have some market
power because they can get and sell copies of an information good before it is on the market without the
authorization of the incumbent. In this respect, we allow the pirate the advantage of deciding before the
incumbent whether to enter or not. To that end we have extended the model developed by Martínez-
Sánchez (2010), which analyzes the roles of the government and the incumbent in preventing commercial
piracy.3 He shows that the government will not help the incumbent to become a monopolist, even if the
incumbent installs an antipiracy system, because a monopoly provides the lowest social welfare. However,
it will let the pirate enter as a follower or as a leader, or encourage the incumbent to set a low enough
price to successfully deter the pirate from entering the market, which depends on the technology for
monitoring the pirate.
Our analysis shows that a monopoly is not an equilibrium when both the incumbent and consumers
lobby the government on the policy of preventing commercial piracy. Secondly, the cost of monitoring the
pirate is very important in determining (truthful) equilibria, as is the case without lobby competition.
Thirdly, for the case, where the pirate entering the market as a follower is a truthful equilibrium, it is
necessary for the government to make a major eﬀort to compare what happens when there is and is not
any lobbying. Finally, we ﬁnd that lobby competition implies that the demand for original products is
at least the same as that obtained without lobbies. This is because it is easier to curb commercial piracy
with lobby competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model formally. The equilibrium
is obtained in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
3Commercial piracy is deﬁned as those cases in which some ﬁrms make and sell copies of a good without the authorization
of the incumbent (Banerjee (2003), Poddar (2003), Martínez-Sánchez (2010), Kiema (2008) and López-Cuñat and Martínez-
Sánchez (2009)).
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. θ is assumed to follow a
uniform distribution, and represents the consumers’ tastes for the quality of a product. Each consumer
is assumed to buy only one unit of the good or none at all. We consider that consumers form a pressure
group to lobby the government on the policy of preventing commercial piracy, and we assume that the
payment of consumers’ lobby to the government is equivalently allocated among them, independently
of its purchase decisions. So that consumers’ payments do not aﬀect its purchase decisions. Thus, the





θqi − pi if he buys the original product
θqp − pp if he buys the pirated product
0 if he does not buy
(1)
where pi, qi, pp and qp are the price and quality of the original and pirated products, respectively.
We assume qi >q p > 0.L e txi = pi/qi and xp = pp/qp be the incumbent’s and pirate’s hedonic prices,
respectively. Since qualities are common knowledge, decisions on prices are equivalent to decisions on
hedonic prices. Let r = qi/qp > 1 be the ratio of qualities.
Firms’ demand functions are obtained as follows. Let θo be a consumer who is indiﬀerent to buying
the original and pirated products. From (1), θo =( rxi − xp)/(r − 1). Let θi be a consumer indiﬀerent
to buying from the incumbent and not buying at all, that is, θi = xi.L e tθp be a consumer indiﬀerent
to buying from the pirate and not buying at all, that is, θp = xp. The demands faced by the incumbent
and the pirate are
Di (xi,x p)=
(














− θp if xi ≥ xp
(3)
According to the terminology on common agency models (Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Dixit
et al. (1997)) we consider the consumer lobby as an individual principal that maximizes the net utility
of consumers Uc (α,G,Tc (α,G)) = CS(α,G)−Tc (α,G),w h e r eCS(.) and Tc (.) represent the consumer




(θqp − pp)dθ +
Z θ
θo
(θqi − pi)dθ (4)
We assume that a ﬁrm remains in the market if and only if it is making a positive proﬁt. Like
consumers, we let the incumbent lobby the government on the policy of preventing commercial piracy. If
4We assume that consumers do not face the risk of prosecution for the use of copies because they did not make copies
of original products and sell them, which is true for the penal codes of most countries (e.g., see articles 270 to 272 of the
Spanish penal code).
4the pirate’s illegal operations are detected, which occurs with probability α,h em u s tp a yt h ep e n a l t yG
and he loses his income. Thus the expected proﬁts of the incumbent and the pirate are:
Ui(.)=qixiDi(xi,x p) − Ti (α,G),U p(.)=( 1− α)qpxpDp(xi,x p) − αG, (5)
where Ti (α,G) represents the payment function of the incumbent to the government. We consider that
the cost incurred by the incumbent in developing an original product is a sunk cost and the production
costs of both the incumbent and the pirate are zero as in Banerjee (2003), Martínez-Sánchez (2010) and
López-Cuñat and Martínez-Sánchez (2009).
The government is responsible for monitoring and penalizing the pirate. Let α and G be the mon-
itoring rate of a pirate and the penalty that the government imposes on the pirate if he is detected,




,w h e r eG is the maximum legal penalty. Let C(α) be the cost
of monitoring piracy. We assume C(0) = 0,C0(0) = 0,C0(α) > 0.L e t αG + αδIp (xi,x p) − C(α)
be the net expected revenue of the government, where Ip (xi,x p)=qpxpDp(xi,x p) represents the pi-
rate’s revenue and δ ∈ [0,1] represents the government’s ability to reuse the revenue seized from the
pirate. The government chooses the antipiracy policy (α,G) that maximizes its net utility function
G(α,G,C)=Ti (α,G)+Tc (α,G)+aW (α,G),w h e r eW (α,G) is the social welfare and a indicates the
weight the government attaches to social welfare, which is the sum of the proﬁts of the incumbent and
the pirate, the consumer surplus and the net expected revenue of the government.
We include the pirate’s proﬁt in social welfare because he is an agent that generates revenue and helps
to avoid the incumbent setting high prices. However, we may decide not to include the pirate on ethical
and moral grounds. In that case, the results obtained hold if the marginal monitoring cost of piracy is
high enough.5
Given that in common agency models there is a multiplicity of equilibrium to overcome it we consider
the truthful equilibrium reﬁnement introduced by Bernheim and Whinston (1986). We deﬁne a truthful
equilibrium as an equilibrium in which all payment functions are truthful relative to the equilibrium
utility levels. A truthful payment function is a payment function that rewards the agent exactly the
amount of change in the principal’s utility when he changes action, provided that the payment before
and after the change is strictly positive. Thus, the principal obtains the same utility for all actions that
induce positive payments (see Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Dixit et al. (1997)). Formally, a
payment function Th (α,G,uh) for principal h ∈ {c,i} is truthful relative to the constant utility uh if
Th (α,G,uh)=m a x( 0 ,U h (α,G) − uh).
The complete information game is the following:
Stage 1. Each lobby chooses a payment schedule simultaneously and without cooperating.
Stage 2. The government announces the policy (α,G) to maximize social welfare.
Stage 3. The pirate decides whether to price ﬁrst or not. If he decides to price ﬁrst he becomes the
leader on prices (l-subgame), but if he waits he becomes a follower on prices and decides whether to enter
the market or not after the incumbent has set the price of the original product (f-subgame).
5See Martínez-Sánchez (2010) for more details.
5Stage 4. Finally, consumers decide to buy the original product, the pirated product or neither after
they have observed ﬁrms’ prices.




H e r e ,w es o l v et h es u b g a m ew h e r et h ep i r a t ed e c i d es to wait, so he becomes a follower on prices. The






xi/2 if 0 ≤ xi ≤
2θ(r−1)
2r−1
rxi − (r − 1)θ if
2θ(r−1)





2r ≤ xi ≤ θ
(6)
By substituting (6) in the pirate’s proﬁt, we obtain the pirate’s maximum proﬁt πc
p (xi)=( 1− α)qiγ (xi)−







4(r−1) if 0 ≤ xi ≤
2θ(r−1)
2r−1 ¡













2r ≤ xi ≤ θ
(7)
The pirate decides to enter the market when Up (xi) > 0, i.e. when γ (xi) >g ,w h e r eg = αG/qi (1 − α)
is increasing in α and G and indicates the government’s eﬀorts to prevent piracy. Hence, for simplicity, we
represent the antipiracy policy though the variable g instead of (α,G).N o t et h a tγ (xi) >gis equivalent
to xi >x ne
i ,w h e r exne
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Therefore, the pirate’s optimal decision is to enter and price xBR
p (xi) if xi >x ne
i ; and to not enter if
xi ≤ xne














− Ti (g) if xne
i <x i ≤ θ
(9)
6We assume xne
i is equal to +∞ when θ/4r<gfor convenience of analysis only. This means that the pirate is deterred
from entering at any price when the government’s eﬀort is very high.
































p are the incumbent’s and pirate’s revenues when the pirate is the follower. We ﬁnd
that when the government makes little eﬀort to combat commercial piracy (g very low), the pirate enters
as a follower and price xf
p, and when the government makes a major eﬀort (g very high), the pirate’s
entry is blocked, so that the incumbent becomes a monopolist that prices at a monopoly price of xm
i .
However, for intermediate levels of government eﬀort, the incumbent ﬁnds it optimal to set a low enough
price (xne
i ) to prevent commercial piracy. These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In any SPE, the optimal strategies of the incumbent and the pirate are:








8(r − 1)(2r − 1)
. (11)
(b) The incumbent will price x∗
i = x
f
i and the pirate will price x∗
p = xf
p if g<g l.
(c) The incumbent will price x∗
i = xne
i if gl ≤ g<g m,a n dx∗
i = xm







4 if 1 <r≤ 3/2
θ
2
16(r−1) if 3/2 ≤ r.
(12)
Proof: see Appendix A in Martínez-Sánchez (2010).
Note that when gm ≤ g, commercial piracy is only eliminated because of the high expenditure em-
ployed by the government in preventing it, so the incumbent can set a monopoly price. However, when
gl ≤ g<g m, government intervention must be accompanied by the incumbent setting a low enough price,
so the incumbent shares with the government the cost of eliminating commercial piracy.
3.1.2 L-subgame
T h el - s u b g a m ei sr e a c h e dw h e nt h ep i r a t ep r i c e sﬁrst and thus becomes the leader on prices. The







θ(r − 1) + xp
¢





2r−1 ≤ xp ≤ θ/2
θ/2 if θ/2 ≤ xp ≤ θ
(13)
The pirate incorporates the incumbent’s reaction function into his proﬁt function and chooses the






















p is the incumbent’s and the pirate’s revenue when the pirate is the leader. Since the
incumbent’s proﬁt is not negative he always enters the market. Note that the pirate’s proﬁta sl e a d e r
(Up =( 1− α)Il
p − αG) is positive if and only if g<I l
p/qi = g0.
3.1.3 Pirate: leader or follower
In this subsection we analyze the pirate’s optimal decision about when to enter the market. From
results obtained in each subgame, the results obtained are that if the pirate waits he anticipates proﬁt
of UF
p =( 1− α)If
p − αG > 0 when g<g l,a n dπF
p =0when gl ≤ g. But if the pirate prices ﬁrst he
can expect a proﬁto fUL
p =( 1− α)Il
p − αG, which is positive if and only if g<g 0.S i n c e gl <g 0,t o
obtain the pirate’s optimal decision we have to compare UF
p with UL
p in the three regions given by g<g l,
gl ≤ g<g 0,a n dg0 ≤ g.
For g<g l,w eh a v eUF
p =( 1− α)If
p − αG,a n dUL
p =( 1− α)Il
p − αG.S i n c e If
p >I l
p,t h ep i r a t e
decides to wait to price the copy until after the incumbent prices the original product.
For gl ≤ g<g 0,w eh a v eUF
p =0and UL
p > 0.S i n c eUL
p >U F
p , the pirate prices the copy before the
incumbent prices the original product.
For g = g0,w eh a v eUF
p =0and UL
p =0 . To ensure the existence of equilibrium it is necessary for
the pirate to become a follower that will not enter later.
For g0 <g ,w eh a v eUF
p =0and UL
p < 0. So the pirate decides to wait and becomes a follower that
will not enter the market.
As we can see, the pirate’s optimal decision, like the incumbent’s optimal decision, depends on the
level of expenditure by the government on avoiding commercial piracy. When g<g l,t h ep i r a t ew a i t s
since his proﬁt is higher as a follower. However, when gl ≤ g<g 0, he prices ﬁrst because he anticipates a
proﬁt of zero as a follower, since the incumbent deters him from entering the market through prices, and
a positive proﬁt as a leader, since when he prices ﬁrst he restricts himself to force the incumbent not to
deter him. The following proposition shows the pirate’s optimal decision according to the government’s
expenditure:
Proposition 2 In any SPE,
(a) The pirate will wait and price the pirated product as a follower x∗
p = xf
p,w h e ng<g l.S o t h e




(b) The pirate will become the leader and price x∗
p = xl
p,w h e ngl ≤ g<g 0. So the incumbent becomes
a follower and prices x∗
i = xl
i.
(c) The pirate becomes a follower that will later not enter, when g0 ≤ g. So the incumbent becomes a
monopolist that prices x∗
i = xne
i when g0 ≤ g<g m,a n dx∗
i = xm
i when gm ≤ g.
83.2 Government’s optimal policy
In this subsection, we look for the government’s optimal policy. In line the technical methodology
developed by Laussel and Le Breton (2001) and Laussel (2006), we know that a truthful equilibrium
consists of an anti-piracy policy g that maximizes a weighted sum of the gross utility levels of the lobbies
and the government. Therefore, the government’s policy on avoiding commercial piracy go ≡ (αo,G o)
represents a truthful equilibrium if:
go ∈ argmax
g≥0
Ω(g)=aW (g)+πi (g)+CS(g) (15)
From the results previously obtained, we have that:
Ω(g)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
aW (g)+π
f
i + CSf if 0 ≤ g<g l,
aW (g)+πl
i + CSl if gl ≤ g<g 0,
aW (g)+πne
i (g)+CSne (g) if g0 ≤ g<g m,
aW (g)+πm
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p − α(1 − δ)If
p − C (α) if 0 ≤ g<g l,
CSl + πl
i + Il
p − α(1 − δ)Il
p − C (α) if gl ≤ g<g 0,
CSne (g)+πne
i (g) − C (α) if g0 ≤ g<g m,
CSm + πm





8(2r−1)2 ; CSl =
qiθ
2(16r3+12r2−15r+3)








Given that a higher monitoring rate (α) entails a higher cost, a higher penalty (G)d o e sn o te n t a i la
higher cost and α ≡
qigl
qigl+G is decreasing in G, the government will choose the maximum penalty, which
is G.N o t e t h a t Ω(g) is decreasing in α s i n c e( i )t h ev a l u e sCSk,πk
i ,Ik
p,k ∈ {f,l,m} are independent









/2 is decreasing in α because g ≡ αG/qi (1 − α) is
increasing in α, xne
i is increasing in g and CSne + πne
i is decreasing in xne
i ; and (iii) the monitoring
cost of piracy is increasing in α, C0 (α) > 0. So in order to maximize Ω(g) the government will choose
the minimum monitoring rate that leads to diﬀerent outcomes, which is α ∈ {αf,α l,α ne,α m},w h e r e




qig0+G and αm =
qigm
qigm+G. As a result, since g is increasing in α,s o c i a l
welfare is decreasing in g,s ot h ev a l u eo fg in the social maximum is reached in {0,g l,g 0,g m}.T h e
maximum value of Ω(g) is obtained from comparing the following values:
Ωf = ac Wf + π
f
i + CSf
Ωl = ac Wl + πl
i + CSl − aCl
Ωne =( a +1 )c Wne − aC (αne)
Ωm =( a +1 )c Wm − aC (αm)
9where c Wk = CSk +πk
i +Ik
p represents the gross social welfare in outcome k ∈ {f,l,ne,m}.W ek n o w
that πne
i0 and CSne

















y = c Wx−c Wy be the gain in gross social welfare in outcome x as compared to outcome y.L e t
Cl = C (αl)+( 1− δ)αlIl
p be the social cost that the government supports when the pirate is a leader,
where the ﬁrst term is the cost of monitoring commercial piracy and the second is the expected money
loss of the revenue seized from the pirate. For the sake of simplicity we call Cne = C (αne).T h ev a l u eo f




8(2r−1)2 ; c Wl =
θ
2qi(48r3−28r2−9r+5)

































i − CSl − πl
i
¢
/a > 0. As can be seen in Proposition 3 and in Figure 1, we obtain similar
results to the case without lobby competition (Martínez-Sánchez (2010)). Thus, the cost of getting an
outcome (in particular, the cost of monitoring piracy) is very important in determining truthful equilibria,
such as the case without lobby competition. Note that when a goes to inﬁnity, β goes to zero, and regions
approach those regions in the model without lobbies. The intuition is that when the government attaches
a higher weight to social welfare, the ability of lobbies to inﬂuence it is lowered.
Proposition 3 The unique truthful equilibrium is:
(a) go =0if Ck > ∆c Wk
f + β
k
f for all k ∈ {l,ne};
(b) go = gl if Cne − Cl > ∆c Wne
l + β
ne




(c) go = gne if Cne − Cl < ∆c Wne
l + β
ne




From (21), given that C0 (α) > 0, we can deduce that a monopoly (with no restriction in prices)
provides the lowest social welfare due to the excessive power of the incumbent in the market. Thus,
the government never chooses αm provided that the incumbent’s revenue is high enough for supporting
the cost of developing the original product. Otherwise, the government will let the incumbent become a
monopolist because he does not want to distort the incumbent’s incentives to develop new products.
As can be seen from Figure 1 and Proposition 3, the outcome that maximizes social welfare depends
on the relationship between gross social welfare and the cost of getting each outcome. In particular,
encouraging the incumbent to deter the pirate from entering maximizes social welfare if the cost of
getting this outcome is low enough; letting the pirate be the leader maximizes social welfare if the cost
of getting this outcome is low enough and that cost in ne-outcome is high enough; otherwise, letting the
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Figure 1: Truthful Equilibrium
By comparing Figures 1(a) and 1(b) we can see that: (i) the region that determines the outcome
ne as a truthful equilibrium is bigger with lobby competition, which implies that when the equilibrium
without lobby competition is the outcome ne, this is also a truthful equilibrium when there are lobbies;
and (ii) with lobby competition, for the outcome f to become a truthful equilibrium it is necessary for
the government’s eﬀorts in achieving outcomes l and ne to be higher in comparison to the cost without
lobby competition. Thus, it is more diﬃcult for the pirate to enter as a follower when we incorporate
lobby competition.
As we can see in Figure 1(b) is divided into six regions, so that outcome f is a truthful equilibrium
in region (iv), outcome l is a truthful equilibrium in regions (v) and (vi) and outcome ne is a truthful
equilibrium in regions (i), (ii) and (iii). Note that the outcome that is a truthful equilibrium maxi-
mizes social welfare in regions (i), (iv) and (vi). In other words, there are truthful equilibria that do
not maximize social welfare (regions (ii), (iii) and (v)) contrary to the case without lobby competition
(Martínez-Sánchez (2010)).
From Martínez-Sánchez (2010), we know that the relationship between the demands in every outcome
is (22). Thus, as we can see in Figure 1 (b), in regions (i), (iv) and (vi), the demands for the original
and the pirated products do not change regard to the case without lobby competition, but in regions (ii),
(iii) and (v), original product’s demand is higher and pirated product’s demand is lower. Thus, lobby
competition implies that the demand for original products is at least the same as that obtained without









7See Gil (2006), Gil (2007) and Martínez-Sánchez (2007) for an interesting discussion about this point.
114C o n c l u s i o n s
We have developed a common agency model to analyze the problem of preventing commercial piracy
when the incumbent and consumers lobby the government on the policy of preventing it and the pirate
tries to avoid being stopped.
Our analysis shows that a monopoly is not an equilibrium when both the incumbent and consumers
lobby the government on the policy of preventing commercial piracy. Secondly, the cost of monitoring the
pirate is very important in determining (truthful) equilibria, such as the case without lobby competition
(Martínez-Sánchez (2010)). Thirdly, for the case where the pirate entering the market as a follower is a
truthful equilibrium, it is necessary for the government to make a major eﬀort to compare what happens
when there is and is not any lobbying. Finally, we ﬁnd that lobby competition implies the demand for
original products is at least the same as that obtained without lobbies.
In this model, the government only considers the social welfare generated in one market, so it does
not take into account the impact of its decision in other markets. Therefore, it would be interesting to
extend our model to analyze the eﬀect on the behaviour of incumbents in other markets.
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